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
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
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
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Chile Loses UN Election--Even When Running
Against Itself

The Soviet campaign to isolate and embarrass Chile in international forums has been raised to new heights of absurdity at the UN. In an election yesterday in one of the Economic and Social Council's subsidiary commissions, Chile lost its bid for a seat--even though it was the only candidate.

Elective positions in UN organs are usually divided among the five regional groups (Latin America, Asia, Africa, East Europe, West Europe and Others). Only when the regional group concerned cannot agree on a slate of candidates for its allocated positions is the entire UN membership called upon to settle the deadlock by vote. In yesterday's action, Uruguay withdrew its candidacy for the Human Rights Commission, leaving Chile the uncontested--and regionally supported--candidate for the seat.

The Soviets, however, demanded a secret vote and with the help of their East European allies voted Uruguay into the position. The chairman of the meeting subsequently upheld this Soviet procedural finagling and despite objections by a number of delegations, Uruguay will keep the position on the commission.

The Brazilian judgment on yesterday's election--"the rules are an ass"--reflects the frustration of many UN members with the almost constant political manipulations that go on in UN meetings. But when given their own opportunities to manipulate, such criticism of procedural violations is usually muted.



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West Germans Reassess Their Policy on
Troop Reductions

As prospects improve for some progress later this year in the Vienna troop reduction negotiations, West German officials are increasingly concerned that any future agreement may be disadvantageous to the Federal Republic. The Germans believe that strong domestic factors preclude any major alteration of Bonn's basically conservative policy in the negotiations.

Three factors lie behind the revived West German concern:

- the prospect that the momentum of the negotiations will pick up if the European security conference is concluded this summer or fall.
- Washington's desire to generate movement in Vienna by introducing a proposal to reduce US tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, in return for substantial reductions in Soviet armored forces in Eastern Europe.
- recent comments by US Senators suggesting that Congress might pass resolutions to reduce US troops in Europe if there is no progress in Vienna in the next year or so.

For the past year, most officials in Bonn have viewed the talks with considerable skepticism, doubting that reductions in conventional arms would work to West Germany's

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advantage in the long run. Bonn's primary interest in continuing the MBFR negotiations, despite the lack of progress, stems from the fear that other NATO allies might succumb to domestic pressures and make unilateral force reductions should the multilateral talks collapse.

Bonn agrees in principle to introducing the nuclear package in the negotiations but has bargained hard with London and Washington on the details. The West Germans hope that the nuclear package will help secure Soviet agreement to reduce NATO and Pact ground forces to a common ceiling.

Bonn and the other West European governments may still have to face Soviet demands for cuts in indigenous forces in the first stage of troop reductions. Officially, the West Germans endorse NATO's goal of limiting first-stage reductions to Soviet and American ground forces.

However, working-level officials have in the past suggested that Bundeswehr reductions in the first stage might be acceptable under certain circumstances, particularly if such reductions could be accomplished without setting a national sub-ceiling. In Bonn's view, the Soviet desire to establish sub-ceilings on national forces is a clear attempt to interfere in the West European defense structure.

The Schmidt government will have to weigh carefully any move in this direction. West Germany, unlike its fellow Western participants in the negotiations, is under no financial or political pressure to reduce its military forces. The opposition Christian

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Democrats would be likely to attack such a decision, claiming that the Social Democrats are making unwarranted concessions to the Soviets.

Should the Soviets react negatively to the nuclear package or demand the inclusion of West European nuclear elements, Bonn would probably call for a general review of the Alliance's negotiating position rather than agreeing to raise the nuclear ante.

The West German negotiators might advocate small reductions in ground forces by NATO and the Pact. Chancellor Schmidt reportedly believes that the present Allied position on asymmetrical reductions to achieve a common ceiling is not realistic in the final analysis, mainly because the Soviets cannot be expected to go along.

The West Germans would hope that this fall-back position would keep the negotiations going and help forestall additional pressures in the West for unilateral reductions.

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Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers Will Meet

The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey are scheduled to meet in Geneva on May 18 to discuss their rival claims to the Aegean and other points of friction. Their meeting will probably set the stage for talks later this month between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Turkish Prime Minister at the NATO summit in Brussels, although the Greeks are still saying that Karamanlis has not decided whether or not he will attend.

Despite mutual suspicion of the other's intentions, both sides appear ready to negotiate the issues which divide them. Although these matters are too complex to be easily or rapidly resolved, the talks should improve the overall tone of Greek-Turkish relations, in itself not a minor accomplishment.

The two foreign ministers will reportedly discuss the text of a document which will be submitted to the International Court of Justice on their conflicting claims to mineral rights on the Aegean continental shelf. Athens and Ankara agreed last February to take their case to The Hague but the Turks had asked for a preliminary meeting between the foreign ministers.

Although Foreign Minister Bitsios is also prepared to discuss the Cyprus issue, he told the US embassy that he was not officially empowered to negotiate for the Greek side and had no intention of substituting

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himself for Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides. Bitsios also expressed concern that his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil could be adversely affected by the Turkish Cypriot referendum on the new Turkish Cypriot constitution, which will be held on the same day he is due to meet the Turkish foreign minister.

The Turks will probably hope to discuss other outstanding issues such as air rights in the Aegean, territorial waters, treatment of Turkish minorities living in Greece, and Greek militarization of the Dodecanese and other islands.

Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios has told US officials, however, that he does not want to have the conversation burdened with too many issues other than the continental shelf. He was particularly sensitive about the Aegean Islands and repeated the position Athens took last spring that matters relating to Greek sovereignty were "non-negotiable."

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